Paolo Gregoretti – Franz Brentano. Bibliografia completa (1862-1982) – Trieste, Università degli Studi, 1983. (I. Works by Franz Brentano 7; II. Translations 21; III. Studies on Brentano 25; Index of Authors 81-87).
Wilhelm Baumgartner and F. P. Burkard – Franz Brentano Bibliographie in: International bibliography of Austrian philosophy 1982/83 – Internationale Bibliographie zur osterreichischen Philosophie – Compiled with assistance of Thomas Binder, Jutta Valent, Helmut Werba – Amsterdam, Rodopi 1990.
Liliana Albertazzi – Immanent realism: an introduction to Brentano – Dordrecht, Springer 2006, pp. 341-354.
Selected Bibliography on Brentano’s Contributions to Logic and Ontology
- “Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978).
Special Issue. Contributions to the Brentano-Konferenz Graz, 4-8 September 1977 (Edited by Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller).
Edgar Morscher: Brentano and his place in Austrian philosophy 1; George Katkov: The world in which Brentano believed he lived 11; Stephan Körner: Über Brentanos Reismus und die extensionale Logik 29; Burnham Terrell: Quantification and Brentano’s logic 45; Klaus Hedwig: Der scholastische Kontext des Intentionalen bei Brentano 67; Dagfinn Follesdal : Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and perception 83; Herbert Spiegelberg: On the significance of the correspondence between Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl 95; Izydora Dambska: François Brentano et la pensée philosophique en Pologne: Casimir Twardowski et son École 117; Peter Geach: Intentionality of thought versus intentionality of desire 131; Elizabeth Anscombe: Will and emotion 139; Heiner Rutte: Brentanos antinaturalistische Grundlegung der Ethik 149; Guido Küng: Zur Erkenntnistheorie von Franz Brentano 169; Paul Weingartner: Brentano’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and the principle “Ens et verum convertuntur” 183; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano’s conception of substance and accident 197; Rudolf Haller: Brentanos Sprachkritik, oder dass “man unterscheiden muss was es (hier) zu unterscheiden gibt” 211; Johann Götschl: Brentanos Analyse des Zeitbegriffes 225; Rolf George: Brentano’s relation to Aristotle 249; Liste der Teilnehmer an der Brentano-Konferenz 267.
- “The Descriptive Psychology of the Brentano School.” Topoi 6 (1987): 1-64.
Guest editors: Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller.
Contents: R. M. Chisholm and R. Haller: Introduction 1; Klaus Hedwig: Brentano’s hermeneutics 3; Stephan Körner: On Brentano’s objections to Kant’s theory of knowledge 11; Heiner Rutte: On the problem of inner perception 19; Peter M. Simons: Brentano’s reform of logic 25; Barry Smith: The substance of Brentano’s ontology 39; Enzo Melandri: The ‘Analogia Entis’ according to Franz Brentano: a speculative-grammatical analysis of Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ 51; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano’s theory of pleasure and pain 59.
- La Scuola Di Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988.
Contents: Wilhelm Baumgartner: Die Rolle des deskriptiven Psychologie Franz Brentanos am Beispiel der ‘Wahrnehrung’ 5; Stefano Besoli: La psicologia descrittiva e il primato dell’esperienza. Rilievi su alcune divergenze rilevabili tra il sistema concettuale di Dilthey e quello di Brentano 26; Reinhard Mamitz: Deskriptive Psychologie als unerlässliche Grundlage wissenschaftlicher Philosophie? Eine Darstellung und kritische Analyse des Psychologismus Franz Brentanos 58; Paolo Spinicci: Some observations on the concept of descriptive psychology in the philosophy of Franz Brentano 82; Enzo Melandri: Emozione, sentimento e conoscenza dal punto di vista fenomenologico 93; Kevin Mulligan: Judgings: their parts and counterparts 117; Natale Stucchi: Perception, representation and persuasion in the scientific work of Vittorio Benussi 149; Richard Sylvan: Supplanting maximization, and other utilitarian assumptions, in Western ethical ideology. A satisizing alternative to Brentano’s foundations 167-194.
Also published as Topoi Supplementary volume 2.
- “Brentano Et Son École.” Études Philosophiques 64 (2003).
Index: Jocelyn Benoist: Brentano et son école 1; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Le contenut et la méthode des philosophies de Franz Brentano et Carl Stumpf 3; Wojciech Zelaniec: Le Brentano de la “Deskriptive Psychologie”: l’homme qui savait décrire (et poursuivait un objectif double en décrivant) 23; Jocelyn Benoist: Sprachkritik ou sémantique: sur le schisme de l’école brentanienne 35; Ronan de Calan: La caractéristique empiriste: la théorie de la rélation de Hume a Ehrenfels 53; Remarques sur le couple forme/matière. Entre ontologie et grammaire chez Anton Marty 65; Wioletta Miskiewicz: Réalisme gnoséologique contre réalisme sceptique: Ingarden et la réception de Brentano en Pologne 83; Claire Marin: L’oeil et la main: la “métaphysique du toucher” dans la philosophie française, de Ravaisson à Derrida 99-112.
- “The School of Brentano and Husserlian Phenomenology.” Studia Phaenomenologica 3 (2003).
Contents: Ion Tanasescu, Victor Popescu: Introduction 9; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Franz Brentano, “Grossvater” der Phänomenologie 15; Jocelyn Benoist: Quelques remarques sur la doctrine brentanienne de l’évidence 61; Ion Tanasescu: Ist die Empfindung intentional? Der Brentanosche Hintergrund einer Kritik Husserls 75; Klaus Hedwig: “Inseln des Unglücks”. Die Stellung des Schlechten im Summationsprinzip der Güter. Aristoteles-Brentano-Katkov 99; Victor Popescu: Espace et mouvement chez Stumpf et Husserl. Une approche méréologique 115; Claudio Majolino: Le différend logique: jugement et énoncé. Eléments pour une reconstruction du débat entre Husserl et Marty 135; Dale Jacquette: Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption 155; Carlo Ierna: Husserl on the Infinite 179; Robin Rollinger: Husserl’s Elementary Logic. The 1896 Lectures In Their Nineteenth Century Context 195; Bernhardt Waldenfels: Zwischen Sagen und Zeigen. Überlegungen zu Husserls Theorie der okkasionellen Ausdrücke 215; Bruce Bégout: Percevoir et juger. Le rôle de la croyance originelle (Urdoxa) dans la phénoménologie du jugement de Husserl 229-270.
- Albertazzi Liliana. “Brentano and Mauthner’s Critique of Language.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2, no. 145 (1989): 158.
“Though different in methodological approach to language, Brentano and Mauthner share a similar background: Positivism, Aristotelian studies, empiricist psychology, anti-Kantian stance. The critique of language marks the point of significant convergence: Brentano’s emphasis of reism and nominalism goes together with (1) his descriptive-semasiologic critique of language as a logical doctrine of the categories, and (2) his critique of language as a genetic semasiology, both bound by the view of the intentional nature of language. It is pointed out at lenghts that and how the component of genetic semasiology in Brentano allows comparison with the communicative, pragmatic and performative perspective of Mauthner’s Sprachkritik due to a shared emphasis on the rhetorical force of language.”
- ———. “Nominalismo E Critica Delle Idee in Brentano.” Idee (1990): 217-235.
- ———. “Brentano, Twardowski, and Polish Scientific Philosophy.” In Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan. 11-40. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993.
- ———. “Brentano, Meinong and Husserl on Internal Time.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3 (1993): 89-110.
“Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology marks a breakthrough into clarification of internal time, made possible by using his doctrine of intentionality (and modality) of consciousness. Husserl’s version of descriptive psychology, a pure phenomenological psychology, according to its author tries to overcome Brentano’s (naturalistic) description of internal experience by explicitly considering the intentional content of mental events, and the different categories of objects as objects of a possible consciousness. Husserl’s investigations on internal time are an example of a quite specific sort of genetic inquiry, complementary to the descriptive one. Meinong, when discussing the relation of representation and perception of time, differentiates between the time as given in a representation (act time), in different sorts of (Meinongian) objects (object time), and in contents (content time). These questions of a Brentanist temporality problem are reconsidered and brought to a Husserlian conclusion.”
- Albertazzi Liliana, and Poli Roberto, eds. Brentano in Italia. Una Filosofia Rigorosa, Contro Positivismo E Attualismo. Milano: Guerini, 1993.
Indice: Giovanni Piana: Presentazione 9; Liliana Albertazzi, Roberto Poli: Introduzione. Brentano: il puzzle incompleto 11; I Pragmatisti 19. Antonio Santucci: Franz Brentano e i pragmatisti italiani 21; Francesca Modenato: Conoscere e volere. L’incontro di Vailati e Calderoni con Brentano 47; Roberto Poli: Le credenze fra logica e mondo. Reismo, pragmatismo e common-sense philosophy: alle soglie del problema dell’analiticità 67; Guido Zingari: Franz Brentano e il problema della conoscenza. Motivi e tematiche a confronto con autori italiani 91; De Sarlo e la sua Scuola 101; Riccardo Luccio, Caterina Primi: De Sarlo e Brentano 103; Simonetta Gori-Savellini: Franz Brentano ed Enzo Bonaventura. Dalla psicologia empirica alla psicologia sperimentale 121; Liliana Albertazzi: Il presente psichico tra analisi concettuale e laboratorio: Franz Brentano e Renata Calabresi 131; Benussi e la psicologia della Gestalt 173; Paolo Bozzi: Vittorio Benussi e la psicologia italiana (intervista a cura di Liana Albertazzi e Roberto Poli) 175; Natale Stucchi: La psicologia teorica di tradizione brentaniana in alcuni lavori sperimentali di Vittorio Benussi 193; Mauro Antonelli: Coscienza e temporalità. Vittorio Benussi e la comprensione del tempo 297; Presenze 235; Wilhelm Baumgartner: I corrispondenti italiani negli archivi di Brentano 237; Luigi Dappiano: Martinetti lettore di Brentano 247; Piero Di Giovanni: Franz Brentano e la biblioteca filosofica di Palermo 261; Inediti. 273; (a) Lettera di Franz Brentano a Giuseppe Amato Pojero (testo originale, p. 286) 275; (b) Corrispondenza Brentano-Salvadori (testi originali, p. 316) 299; Indice dei nomi 335.
- Albertazzi Liliana. “Die Theorie Der Indirekten Modifikation.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 6 (1996): 263-282.
- Albertazzi Liliana, Libardi Massimo, and Poli Roberto, eds. The School of Franz Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996.
Table of contents: Analytical table of contents IX; Foreword by The Editors XV; Introduction. Liliana Albertazzi, Massimo Libardi, Roberto Poli: Brentano and his School: reassembling the puzzle 1; 1. Massimo Libardi: Franz Brentano (1838-1917) 25; Part I: The pupils 81; 2. Liliana Albertazzi: Anton Marty (1847-1914) 83; 3. Karl Schuhmann: Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) 109; 4. Dale Jacquette: Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) 131; 5. Reinhard Fabian: Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) 161; 6. Liliana Albertazzi: Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 175; 7. Roberto Poli: Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) 207; PartII: Topics and influences 233; 8. Wilhelm Baumgartner: Act, content and object 235; 9. Johannes Brandl: Intentionality 261; 10. Paolo Bozzi: Higher-order objects 285; 11. Peter Simons: Logic in the Brentano School 305; 12. Barry Smith: Logic and the Sachverhalt 323; 13. Roberto Poli: Truth theories 343; 14. Jan Wolenski: Reism in the Brentanist tradition 357: 15. Luigi Dappiano: Theories of values 377; 16. Liliana Albertazzi: From Kant to Brentano by Liliana Albertazzi 423; Index of Topics 465; Index of names 467-477.
“The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology – perhaps the most important schism in twentieth-century philosophy – resulted from a radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of thought share, in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen.
The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano and to reconstruct the ‘map’ of Brentanism.
The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive interest in the theoretical complexity of Brentano’s thought and of his pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration.
We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory essays followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically examine Brentano’s thought and that of his followers. The two introductory essays reconstruct the reasons for the ‘invisibility’, so to speak, of Brentano and set out the essential features of his philosophical doctrine. Part 1 of the book then examines six of Brentano’s most outstanding pupils (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2 contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by the Brentanians.
In order to facilitate cross-referencing between the various essays contained in the book, each chapter concludes with a table giving the other points in the book where the same topics are dealt with.” (Foreword by the Editors).
- Albertazzi Liliana. Introduzione a Brentano. Bari: Laterza, 1999.
- ———. “Franz Brentano’s Psychology Today. A Programme of Empirical and Experimental Metaphysics.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10 (2003): 107-118.
“In this article I try to emphasise the following three main points:
1. Brentano’s metaphysics is not speculative; it is instead a programme for scientific research. 2. Some components of his metaphysics, especially those relating to the problem of perceptive continua — and many aspects of it developed experimentally by his pupils — are today discussed not only by philosophy but also by the cognitive sciences, more or less accurately, more or less consciously. 3. Some areas of the cognitive sciences express the need for a scientifically — even neurophysiologically — founded theory of intentionality.”
- ———. “The Psychophysics of the Soul. Aristote and Brentano.” In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis. 249-275. Villeneuve d’Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2004.
- ———. Immanent Realism. An Introduction to Brentano. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Terminological Note XI; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. A Life. A Novel 5; Chapter 2. Brentano and Aristotle 43; Chapter 3. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 83; Chapter 4. Metaphysics and the Science of the Soul 123; Chapter 5. A woodworm in the Intentional Relation 155; Chapter 6. Ficciones 189; Chapter 7. Continua 233; Chapter 8. Reverse Aristotelianism: Metaphysics of Accidents 269; Chapter 9. Other Writings: Ethics, Aesthetics and History of Philosophy 295; Chapter 10. A History of Brentano Criticism 313; Chapter 11. A Wager on the Future 335; Bibliographic Notes 341; References 355; Index of Names 373-378.
- ———. “Retrieving Intentionality. A Legacy from the Brentano School.” In The Lvov-Warsaw School. The New Generation, edited by Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz and Pasniczek, Jacek. 291-314. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006.
- Anasvili Valerij. “Rezeption Franz Brentanos in Russland (Eileitende Materialen).” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 219-231.
- Antonelli Mauro. “Univocità Dell’essere E Intenzionalità Del Conoscere: Saggio Critico Sulla Genesi E Sulle Fonti Del Pensiero Di Franz Brentano.” Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana 49 (1990): 101-123.
- ———. “Auf Der Suche Nach Der Substanz. Zu Brentano Stellung in Der Rezeption Der Aristotelischen Ontologie Im 19. Jahrundert.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1991): 19-46.
- ———. Alle Radici Del Movimento Fenomenologico. Psicologia E Metafisica Del Giovane Franz Brentano. Bologna: Pitagora, 1996.
- ———. Franz Brentano Psicologo. Dalla ‘Psicologia Dal Punto Di Vista Empirico’ Alla ‘Psicologia Descrittiva’. Bologna: Pitagora, 1996.
- ———. “Franz Brentano Und Die Wiederentdeckung Der Intentionalitat. Richtigstellung Herkömmlicher Missverständnisse Und Missdeutungen.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 58-59 (2000): 93-117.
- ———. Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität Im Frühwerk Von Franz Brentano. Freiburg: K. Alber, 2001.
- ———. “La Conception De La Vérité Du Jeune Brentano: De La Dissertation Sur Les Significations Multiples De L’être Aux Leçons De Mètaphysique.” In Propositions Et États De Choses. Entre Être Et Sens, edited by Benoist, Jocelyn. 67-86. Paris: Vrin, 2006.
- ———. “Franz Brentano Et L’ “Inexistence Intentionnelle”.” Philosophiques 36 (2009): 467-487.
- Aquila Richard. “The Status of Intentional Objects.” New Scholasticism 45 (1971): 427-456.
- ———. Intentionality. A Study of Mental Acts. University Park: Pnnsylvania State University Press, 1977.
- ———. “Intentional Objects and Kantian Appearances.” Philosophical Topics 12 (1982): 9-37.
- Bartok Philip J. “Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings.” Journal of History of Philosophy 43 (2005): 437-460.
“Philosophers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions have interpreted Brentano’s intentionality thesis, and his empirical psychology more generally, in significantly different ways. Disregarding Brentano’s distinctive psychological method, analytic philosophers have typically read him as a philosopher of mind, and his intentionality thesis as a contribution to the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more attentive to his method, tended to read Brentano as merely “on the way” to a truly phenomenological approach. I offer a third reading of Brentano thesis, one that attends to both the motivating concerns and the distinctive methodological features of his psychological project.”
- ———. “Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of Ther Mental.” In Intentionality. Past and Future, edited by Forrai, Gabor and Kampis, George. 15-24. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005.
- Baumgartner Elisabeth. Intentionalität. Begriffsgeschichte Und Begriffsanwendung in Der Psychologie. Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann, 1985.
- Baumgartner Wilhelm. “Die Begründung Von Wahrheit Durch Evidenz: Der Beitrag Brentanos.” In Geiwssheit Und Gewissen. Festschrift Für Franz Wiedmann Zum 60. Geburstag, edited by Baumgartner, Wilhelm. 93-116. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1987.
- ———. “Objects Analysed. Brentano’s Way toward the Identity of Objects.” Topoi Supplement 4 (1989): 20-30.
- ———. “Brentanos Und Mills Methode Der Beschreibenden Analyse.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2 (1989): 63-78.
- Baumgartner Wilhelm, and Burkard Franz-Peter. “Franz Brentano: Eine Skizze Seines Lebens Und Seiner Werke.” In International Bibliography of Austrian Philosophy 1982/83 – Internationale Bibliographie Zur Osterreichischen Philosophie, edited by Baumgartner, Wilhelm and Burkard, Franz-Peter. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1990.
- Baumgartner Wilhelm, and Simons Peter M. “Brentanos Mereologie.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1992): 53-77.
- ———. “Brentano’s Mereology.” Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 1 (1994): 55-76.
- Baumgartner Elisabeth, and Baumgartner Wilhelm. “Von Brentano Zu Kulpe: Die Deskriptive Psychologie Brentanos Und Die ‘Urzburger Schule’ Der Denkpsychologie.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 7 (1997): 31-52.
- Baumgartner Wilhelm. “Brentano Un Die Österreischische Philosophie.” In Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang. 131-158. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2004.
- Bausola Adriano. Conoscenza E Moralità in Franz Brentano. Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1968.
- ———. “La Dottrina Sul Giudizio Di Esistenza E La Critica Ad Alcuni Argomenti Per L’esistenza Di Dio in Franz Brentano.” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 92 (2000): 282-294.
- Bell John L. “Continuity and the Logic of Perception.” Transcendent Philosophy 1 (2000): 1-7.
- Benoist Jocelyn. “Qu’est-Ce Qu’un Jugement? Brentano, Frege, Husserl.” Études Phénoménologiques 14, no. 27-28 (1998): 169-192.
- Bergmann Hugo. “Brentano’s Theory of Induction.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5 (1945): 281-292.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.): – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 213-223.
- ———. “Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1965): 94-99.
- ———. “Franz Brentano.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 349-372.
- Bergmann Gustav. Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
Reprinted: Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2004
- Berti Enrico. “Brentano and Aristotle’s Metaphysics.” In Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 135-149. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001.
“Franz Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy has attracted the attention of scholars right up to the present day. It has been considered important above all for two reasons: a) because it constituted the origin of the famous theory of intentionality, which was found in his book on Aristotle’s Psychology (1867); and b) because of the influence that the theory of the several senses of being, developed in his Dissertation of 1862, exercised on the birth of Heidegger’s thought. However, Brentano’s attempt to attribute to Aristotle the concept of creation and the theory of the immortality of the human soul has been almost completely rejected.
The first point was illustrated particularly by R. George and R. Sorabji, (1) but Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotelian psychology was also at the centre of the debate on the “Mind-Body Problem”, which involved several important philosophers, such as H. Putnam, the same R. Sorabji, M. Burnyeat, M. C. Nussbaum and others. (2) A part of his book on Aristotle’s Psychology was included in the recent collection of Essays on Aristotle’s “De anima”.(3) The second point, to which Heidegger himself drew attention in his famous letter to Father Richardson, (4) was studied first by F. Volpi and afterwards by many others, including myself. (5)
The interpretation of Aristotle’s theology expounded by Brentano in an additional essay to Aristotle’s Psychology, was criticised by Eduard Zeller in the third edition of his monumental history of Greek philosophy (1878). This criticism induced Brentano to write an essay on Aristotle’s Creationism (1882), followed by a reply from Zeller, a new intervention on the part of Brentano and a further reply by Zeller (1883), which seemed to close the discussion.(6) But Brentano reprinted his essay of 1882, with some additions, in the volume Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung der menschlichen Geistes (1911) (7) and in the same year he also published a monograph, Aristoteles and seine Weltanschauung, where he repeated the main lines of his interpretation. (8) The controversy was definitively resolved, in my opinion, only with W. D. Ross’s introduction to his edition of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where the famous English Aristotelian refuted any possibility of conceiving Aristotle’s God as a creator, explicitly attacking the interpretation proposed by Brentano.(9)
On this occasion I do not wish to return to the theory of intentionality, even if I will make some reference to it. I would like, on the contrary, to see what consequences the interpretation of Aristotle’s ontology, developed by Brentano in his dissertation of 1862, and his interpretation of Aristotle’s theology, developed in his later writings, had for the modern and contemporary image of Aristotle; that is, how Brentano’s Aristotle influenced contemporary philosophers’ judgements of Aristotle’s metaphysics.” pp. 135-137
(1) Cf. R. George, ‘Brentano’s Relation to Aristotle’, in R.M. Chisholm and R. Haller (eds.), Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978, 249-266; R. Sorabji, ‘From Aristotle to Brentano; the Development of the Concept of Intentionality’, in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds.), Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary Volume, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
(2) I tried to sum up this debate in E. Berti, ‘Aristotele e il “Mind-Body Problem’, Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica 11, 1998, 43-62.
(3) Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous Poietikos, Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867, was republished by R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1967, and was translated into English by R. George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
The first chapter, ‘Nous poietikos: Survey of earlier interpretations’, was included in M. C. Nuussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, 313-341.
(4) This letter (1962), published by Heidegger as Preface to W.J. Richardson, Heidegger, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963, has been developed in his lecture ‘Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie’ (1963), in id., Zur Sache des Denkens, Tubingen, Mohr, 1969, 81-90.
(5) Cf. F. Volpi, Heidegger e Brentano, Padua: Cedam, 1976 (Pubblicazioni della Scuola di perfezionamento in Filosofia dell’Università di Padova), and Heidegger e Aristotele, Padova: Daphne, 1984; J. Taminiaux, Le regard et l’excédent, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1977, 156-182; E. Berti, Aristotele nel Novecento, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1992, 44-111; Th. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
(6) F. Brentano, ‘Ueber den Creatianismus des Aristoteles’, S.-B. d. K. Akad. d. Wiss., philos.hist. Kl., 100, Wien 1882, 95-126; E. Zeller, ‘Aristoteles Lehre von der Ewigkeit des menschlichen Geistes’, S.-B. d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss., Berlin 1882 (repr. in Zeller’s Kleine Schriften, Berlin 1910); F. Brentano, Offener Brief an Herrn professor Dr. Eduard Zeller, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1883; E. Zeller, Deutsche Literaturanzeigung, 1883.
(7) Leipzig: Veit & Comp., 1911 (second edition, with an Introduction by R. George who illustrates the controversy, Hamburg: Meiner, 1980). I examined this topic in E. Berti, ‘Zeller e Aristotele’, Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, cl. di lett. e filos., s. III, vol. XIX.3, Pisa 1989, 1233 -1254.
(8) Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer. In preparing this monograph Brentano wrote a series of notes on Aristotle, which remained unpublished until after his death: cf. F. Brentano, Uber Aristoteles. Nachgelassene Aufsatze, hrsg. v. R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1986.
(9) Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, I, cxxxiii-cxxxix, cxlix, cliii-cliv. I occupied myself with this discussion in E. Berti, ‘Da chi è amato it motore immobile? Su Aristotele, Metaph. XII 6-7’, Methexis 10, 1997, 59-82.
- Besoli Stefano. “Brevi Cenni Intorno Alla Recezione Brentaniana Della Filosofia Di Thomas Reid.” Annali di discipline fisosofiche dell’Università di Bologna (1986): 25-30.
- Binder Thomas. “Die Brentano Gesellschaft Und Das Brentano-Archiv in Prag.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 58-59 (2000): 533-565.
- ———. “Die Prager Brentano Gesellschaft.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 259-286.
- Blackmore John. Ludwig Boltzmann: His Later Life and Philosophy, 1900-1906. Book Two: The Philosopher. Dordrecht: Kuwer, 1995.
See Chapter Six: Franz Brentano pp. 135-153 and Seven: Critical Realism pp. 155-180.
- ———. “Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938.” In The Brentano Puzzle, edited by Poli, Roberto. 73-92. Brookfiled: Ashgate, 1998.
- Brandl Johannes. Brentanos Urteilslehre. Eine Studie Über Die Logische Form Von Akt Und Inhalt. Graz: Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für Österreichische Philosophie, 1987.
- ———. “Intentionality.” Chap. The School of Franz Brentano, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto. 261-284. Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1996.
- Brentano J.C.M. “The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 477-482.
- Brown Deborah. “Immanence and Individuation: Brentano and the Scholastics on Knowledge of Singulars.” Monist 83 (2000): 22-46.
- Buzzoni Marco. “Brentano, Sprache, Ontologie Und Person.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 153-187.
- Campos Eliam. Die Kantkritik Brentanos. Bonn: Bouvier, 1979.
- Chisholm Roderick M. “Intentional Inexistence.” In Perceiving. 168-185. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957.
Chapter XI; reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 140-150
- ———, ed. Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1960.
Contents: Preface V; Editor’s Introduction 3; Selections. 1. Franz Brentano: The distinction between mental and physical phenomena 39; 2. Franz Brentano: Presentation and judgment form. Two distinct fundamental classes 62, 3. Franz Brentano: Genuine and fictitious objects 76; 4. Alexius Meinong: The theory of objects 76; 5. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology 118; 6. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and anthropology 129; 7. H. A. Prichard: Appearances and reality 143; 8. E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding: Introduction to ‘The New Realism’ 151; 9. Samuel Alexander: The basis of realism 186; 10. Bertrand Russell: The ultimate constituents of matter 223; 11. Arthur C. Lovejoy: A temporalistic realism 238; 12. G. E. Moore: A defense of common sense 255; Selected bibliography 283; Index 305-308.
“The translations of Brentano and Meinong and the second translation of Husserl (“Phenomenology and Anthropology”) have not previously been published. The selections from Brentano were translated by D. B. Terrell, of the University of Minnesota, and are taken, with his kind permission, from his translation of Brentano’s Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Meinong’s “The Theory of Objects” was translated by Isaac Levi, of Western Reserve University, D. B. Terrell, and Roderick M. Chisholm. Husserl’s “Phenomenology” was translated by C. V. Salmon, of Belfast University; his “Phenomenology and Anthropology” by Richard Schmitt; of Brown University.” (from the Preface)
- ———. “Brentano’s Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 395-415.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 160-175
- ———. Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional. Vol. Phenomenology and existentialism, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967.
- ———. “Beyond Being and Nonbeing. Beiträge Zur Meinong-Forschung.” In Jenseits Von Sein Und Nichtsein, edited by Haller, Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1972.
Acts of the Colloquium held in Graz September, 30th – October, 4th 1970
- ———. “Brentano’s Conception of Substance and Accident.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 197-210.
“Brentano uses terms in place of predicates (e.g. “a thinker” in place of “thinks”) and characterizes the “is” of predication in terms of the part-whole relation. Taking as his ontological data certain intentional phenomena that are apprehended with certainty, he conceives the substance-accident relation as a define-able type of part-whole relation which we can apprehend in “inner perception”. He is then able to distinguish the following types of individual or ens reale: substances; primary individuals which are not substances; accidents; aggregates; and boundaries.”
- ———. “Brentano’s Analysis of the Consciousness of Time.” In Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume Vi. The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, edited by French, Peter A., Uehling Jr, Theodore E. and Wettstein, Howard K., 3-16. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.
“Franz Brentano’s conception of philosophical analysis is illustrated by his aanalysis of our consciousness of time. The analysandum is not a linguistic expression or a concept; it is an experience of a certain sort. Hence the analysis might be called “phenomenological,” but Brentano prefers to say it is a matter of “descriptive psychology.”
An analysis of our consciousness of time is not, or course, an analysis of time. Hence Brentano’s analysis is consistent with a number of different conceptions of time. But it does presuppose that tense is to be taken seriously. In other words, Brentano does not accept the philosophical view, advocated by many contemporary philosophers of science, according to which distinctions of tense are merely “subjective” or otherwise “illusory.” Nor does he believe that all truths can he expressed in untensed sentences.
I shall begin by formulating what Brentano takes to be a fundamental problem of descriptive psychology — that of accurately describing our awareness of temporal succession. Then I shall set forth the development of his views with respect to this problem.”
- ———. Brentano and Meinong Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982.
Contents: Foreword 1; 1. Brentano’s theory of Substance and Accident 3; 2. Brentano’s theory of Judgment 17; 3. Homeless objects 37; 4. Beyond Being and Nonbeing 53; 5. Correct and incorrect emotion 68; 6. Objectives and intrinsic value 80; 7. The quality of pleasure and displeasure 92; 8. Supererogation and offence 98; 9. Beginnings and endings 114-124.
“I present these papers on Brentano and Meinong in the hope that they will lead the reader back to the originai sources. Some of the papers are expositions and commentaries. Others are developments of certain suggestions first made by Brentano or by Meinong.
The first two papers are concerned with the basic presuppositions of Brentano’s theoretical philosophy. “Brentano’s Theory of Substance and Accident” was presented to the Congress on the Philosophy of Franz Brentano held in Graz in September 1977; it first appeared in the Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. V (1978). The second paper – “Brentano’s Theory of Judgment” – has not been published before; but a preliminary version of part of it, entitled “Brentano’s Nonpropositional Theory of Judgment,” appeared in the Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I (1976). It should be noted that Brentano’s Kategorienlehre, to which many references are made in these two papers, has now been translated into English as The Theory of Categories, The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff 1981.
The four papers that follow are concerned with the theory of value, as it had been conceived by Brentano and developed by Meinong. “Correct and Incorrect Emotion” and “The Quality of Pleasure and Displeasure” are both adapted from “Brentano’s Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion,” which first appeared in the Brentano issue of the Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 20 (1966).
The final paper – “Beginnings and Endings” – is a revision of a paper entitled “Brentano als analytischer Metaphysiker,” which first appeared in the special volume of Conceptus entitled Österreichische Philosophie und ihr Einfluss auf die analytische Philosophie der Gegenwart, Jg. XI (1977), Nr. 28-30, pp. 77-82. A later version appeared in Time and Cause, edited by Peter Van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), pp. 17-25. It has been revised once again for the present volume.
I hope that these essays will be thought of as carrying out the tradition of the Brentano school.” (From the Foreword)
- ———. Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- ———. “The Object of Sensation: A Brentano Study.” Topoi 8 (1989): 3-8.
- ———. “The Formal Structure of the Intentional: A Metaphysical Study.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3 (1991): 11-18.
“What is the metaphysical significance of what Brentano has shown us about intentionality? It is the fact that intentional phenomena have logical or structural features that are not shared by what is not psychological.
It was typical of British empiricism, particularly that of Hume, to suppose that consciousness is essentially sensible. The objects of consciousness were thought to be primarily such objects as sensations and their imagined or dreamed counterparts. In the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Brentano makes clear that intentional phenomena need not be sensible. He is aware that, even if intentional phenomena are always accompanied by sensible or sensational phenomena, they are not themselves sensational or sensible phenomena. And the presence of certain intentional attitudes is at least as certain and indubitable for us as is the presence of our sensations. If I make a certain judgment or ask myself a certain question, then I can know directly and immediately that I make that judgment or ask that question. (This is not to say, of course, that every intentional attitude may be the object of such certainty. Perhaps there is a sense in which you may be said to like or to dislike a certain thing without realizing that you like or dislike that thing.)
If I can know directly and immediately that I am making a certain judgment, then, I can know what it is to make such a judgment. And if I know what it is to make a judgment, then, in making the judgment I can know directly and immediately that there is a certain individual thing – namely, the one who makes the judgment. Arid I, of course, am the one who makes my judgments and does my thinking. The same is true, obviously, of my other intentional activities – such activities as wondering, fearing, hoping, desiring, considering, liking and disliking.”
- ———. “Spatial Continuity and the Theory of Part and Whole. A Brentano Study.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 11-24.
“The concepts of a spatially continuous substance, of spatial dimension and of spatial boundary are here “analyzed out” of the concepts of individual thing, of constituent and of coincidence. The analysis is based upon the theory of spatial coincidence that was developed by Brentano. Its presuppositions are essentially these: (1) if there are spatial objects of any kind, then there are continuous spatial substances. (2) such substances are possibly such that they are not constituents of any individual thing; and (3) they contain constituents (namely, boundaries) which are necessarily such that they are constituents of spatial substances.”
- ———. “Brentano on “Unconscious Consciousness”.” In Consciousness, Knowledge and Truth, edited by Poli, Roberto. 153-160. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
- ———. “Ontologically Dependent Entities.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1994): 499-507.
- Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. “Die Theorie Der Intentionalität Bei Franz Brentano.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 57 (1999): 45-66.
- ———. “Die Theorie Des Zeitbewusstseins Franz Brentano Im Licht Der Unpublizierten Manuskripte.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 149-161.
- ———. Intentionalitätstheorie Beim Frühen Brentano. Dodrdrecht: Kluwer, 2001.
- ———. “Die Wahrheitstheorie Franz Brentanos.” In Philosophie – Wissenschaft – Wirtschaft. Miteinander Denken, Voneinander Lernen. Vorträge Des Vi. Kongresses Der Österreichischen Gesellschaft Für Philosophie, Linz 1.-4. Juni 2000, edited by Neumaier, Otto and Born, Rainer. 456-461. Wien: Verlag Hõlder-Pichler-Tempsky, 2001.
- ———. “Von Brentano Zu Ingarden: Die Phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre.” Husserl Studies 18 (2002): 185-208.
- ———. “Brentano Und Meinong. Zur Ontologie Der Denkobjekte.” In Substanz Und Identität. Beiträge Zur Ontologie, edited by Löffler, Winfried. 155-166. Paderborn: Mentis-Verlag, 2002.
- ———. “Brentano’s Late Ontology.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10 (2003): 221-236.
“In the present paper I want to give an interpretation of Brentano’s late, nominalistic ontology. There are two aspects of this theory: the conception of individual properties containing their substances, presented mainly in the fragments collected in Brentano’s Theory of Categories and the conceptualistic reduction virtually involved in Brentano’s definition of truth.”
- ———. Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004.
- ———. Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein Und Intersubjektivität. Studien Zur Phänomenologie Von Brentano Bis Ingarden. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2005.
- ———. “Brentano, Husserl Und Ingarden Über Die Intentionale Gegenstände.” In Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden., edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 83-114. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag, 2005.
- Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, and Lukasiewicz Dariusz, eds. Actions, Products, and Things. Brentano and Polish Philosophy. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006.
Contents: Introduction 7; Dale Jacquette: Twardowski, Brentano’s dilemma, and the content-object distinction 9; Maria van der Schaar: On the ambiguities of the term Judgement: an evaluation of Twardowski’s distinction between action and product 35; Arianna Betti: The strange case of Savonarola and the painted fish: on the Bolzanization of Polish thought 55, Peter Simons: Things and truths: Brentano and Lesniewski, ontology and logic 83; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: The young Lesniewski on existential propositions 107; Barry Smith: On the phases of Reism 107; Dariusz Lukasiewicz: Brentanian philosophy and Czezowski’s conception of existence 183; Jan Wolenski: Brentanism and the rise of formal semantics 217; Notes on contributors 233; Index of names 235.
- Courtine Jean-François. “L’aristotélisme De Franz Brentano.” Études Phénoménologiques 14, no. 27-28 (1998): 7-50.
- ———. “Brentano Et L’ontologie.” In Compléments De Substance. Études Sur Les Propriétés Accidentelles Offertes À Alain De Libera, edited by Erismann, Christophe and Schniewind, Alexandrine. 197-214. Paris: Vrin, 2008.
- Crane Tim. “Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence.” In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Textor, Mark. 20-35. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Dambska Izydora. “François Brentano Et La Pensée Philosophique En Pologne: Casimir Twardowski Et Son École.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 117-130.
- Danzer Robert. Das Allgemeine Und Das Besondere Zur Ontologie Franz Brentanos. Gelsenkirchen: Eurofamilia GmbH, 1965.
- Deely John. “The Ontological Status of Intentionality.” New Scholasticism 46 (1972): 220-233.
- Dölling Evelyn. “Brentanos Und Freges Urteilslehre — Ein Vergleich.” In Philosophie Und Logik. Frege-Kolloquien, Jena, 1989/1991, edited by Stelzner, Werner. 24-32. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993.
- ———. “Kritik Des Urteilslehre: Land Versus Brentano, Mit Blick Auf Frege.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 7 (1997): 123-146.
- Drummond John. “From Intentionality to Intensionality and Back.” Études Phénoménologiques 14, no. 27-28 (1998): 89-126.
- Dubois James. “Investigating Brentano’s Reism.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 6 (1996): 283-296.
- Eaton Howard Ormsby. The Austrian Philosophy of Values. Norman: University of Oklahoma Pres, 1930.
- Ehrenfels Christian von. “Über Brentano Und Meinong.” In Metaphysik. 426-429. München: Philosophia, 1990.
Vol. 4 of the Philososphische Schriften.
- English Jacques. “Pourquoi Et Comment Husserl En Est Venu À Critiquer Brentano.” Études Phénoménologiques 14, no. 27-28 (1998): 51-88.
- Fano Vincenzo. La Filosofia Dell’evidenza. Saggio Sull’epistemologia Di Franz Brentano. Bologna: CLUEB, 1993.
- ———. “The Categories of Consciousness: Brentano’s Epistemology.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 101-130.
“The present investigation reformulates a few Brentanian ideas concerning what is mental. In particular, an attempt to define the categorial structure implicit in the notion of consciousness and in that of inner perception, keeping in mind their connections with external perception and with unconscious, is outlined. Within the mental field is observed a formal violation of some elementary rules of ontology and mereology, and such violation can be interpreted in terms of an infinite multiplicity of the mental field itself.”
- Fisette Denis, and Fréchette Guillaume, eds. À L’école De Brentano. De Würzbourg À Vienne. Paris: Vrin, 2007.
Table des matières: Denis Fisette et Guillaume Fréchette: Préface 7; Denis Fisette et Guillaume Fréchette: Les legs de Brentano 13; Edmund Husserl: Souvenirs de Franz Brentano 163; Carl Stumpf: Souvenirs de Franz Brentano 175; Christian Ehrenfels; Sur les qualités de forme 225; Alexius Meinong: Sur les objets d’ordre supérieur et leur rapport à la perception interne 261; Kazimierz Twardowski: Fonctions et formations 343; Anton Marty: Sur le rapport entre la grammaire et la logique 385; Références bibliographiques 423; Index des noms propres 441-446
- Fisette Denis. “Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl’s Early Criticism of Brentano.” In Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences. Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl, edited by Ierna, Carlo, Jacobs, Hanne and Mattens, Filip. 135-167. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010.
- Føllesdal Dagfinn. “Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 83-94.
Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus (ed.) – Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science – Cambridge, MIT Press 1982 pp. 31-41.
“The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano’s views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano’s notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl’s notion of hyle, whose role in Husserl’s theory of perception is briefly sketched.”
- Fugali Edoardo. Die Zeit Des Selbst Und Die Zeit Des Seienden. Bewusstsein Und Inneren Sinn Bei Franz Brentano. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004.
Italian edition: Il tempo del sé e il tempo dell’essere. Coscienza e senso interno in Franz Brentano, Napoli, La Città del Sole, 2005.
- ———. “Toward the Rebirth of Aristotelian Psychology: Trendelenburg and Brentano.” In Psychology and Philosophy. Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Heinämaa, Sara and Reuter, Martina. 179-202. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008.
- Galewicz Wlodzimierz. “Die Moglichkeit Der Selbstwahrnehmung Bei Brentano.” Conceptus 25 (1991): 49-57.
- ———. “Substanz Und Individuation in Brentanos Kategorienlehre.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 79-88.
- ———. “Brentano Un Der Epistemologische Fundamentalismus.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 85-106.
- George Rolf. “Brentano’s Relation to Aristotle.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 249-266.
“The paper tries to illustrate the influence of Aristotle’s thought upon Brentano by arguing that the view that all psychological phenomena have objects was proably derived from the Aristotelian conception that the mind can know itself only en parergo, and that this knowledge presupposes that some other thing be in the mind “objectively”. Brentano’s contribution to Aristotle scholarship is illustrated by reviewing some of his arguments against Zeller’s claim that Aristotle’s God, contemplating only himself, is ignorant of the world. The paper concludes with an attempt to explain the relative neglect into which Brentano’s exegetical efforts have fallen.”
- Gilson Étienne. “Franz Brentano’s Interpretation of Mediaeval Philosophy.” Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939): 1-10.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister: – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 56-67
- Gilson Lucie. La Psychologie Descriptive Selon Franz Brentano. Paris: Vrin, 1955.
- ———. Méthode Et Métaphysique Selon Franz Brentano. Paris: Vrin, 1955.
- ———. “Science Et Philosophie Selon Franz Brentano.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 416-433.
Translated in: Linda McAlister – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 68-79
- Grossmann Reinhardt. “Non Existent Objects: Recent Work on Brentano and Meinong.” American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969): 17-32.
- Gutierrez-Cortines Juan. Das Bewusstsein, Die Seienden Und Ihre Beziehungen in Der Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Hamburg1972.
- Haldane John. “Brentano’s Problem.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 35 (1989): 1-32.
- Haller Rudolf. “Brentanos Sprachkritik, Oder Dass “Man Unterscheiden Muss Was Es (Hier) Zu Unterscheiden Gibt”.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 211-224.
Reprinted in: R. Haller – Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie – Amsterdam., Rodopi, 1979 pp. 23-36
- ———. “Franz Brentano, Ein Philosoph Des Empirismus.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 19-30.
- Hedwig Klaus. “Der Scholastische Kontext Des Intentionalen Bei Brentano.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 67-82.
- ———. “Intention: Outlines for the History of a Phenomenological Concept.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1979): 326-340.
- ———. “Brentano’s Hermeneutics.” Topoi 6 (1987): 3-10.
- ———. “Die Historischen Voraussetzungen Un Die Rezeption Brentanos.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 31-45.
- Henry Desmond Paul. “Brentano and Some Medieval Mereologists.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 25-34.
“Discussion of what Brentano calls the ‘strange arithmetic’ involved in the connumeration of overlapping objects is also to be found in Abelard, John Wyclif, and in Leibniz. Brentano’s divergence from the commonly-held medieval distinction between X-part and part-of-X may be partially explained by his adherence to a theory of body resembling that which occurs in a twelfth-century compendium of Porretan logic.”
- Hickerson Ryan. The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness from Brentano to Husserl. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007.
- Hillebrand Franz. Die Neuen Theorien Der Kategorischen Schlüsse. Eine Logische Untersuchung. Wien: Hölder, 1981.
- Hossack Keith. “Reid and Brentano on Consciousness.” In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy, edited by Textor, Mark. 36-63. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Husserl Edmund. “Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano.” In Zur Kenntnins Seines Lebens Und Siner Lehre. Mit Beiträgen Von C. Stumpf Und E. Husserl. 151-167. München, 1919.
Translated in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 47-55
- Ingarden Roman. “Le Concept De Philosophie Chez Franz Brentano. Première Partie.” Archives de Philosophie (1969): 458-475.
- ———. “Le Concept De Philosophie Chez Franz Brentano. Deuxième Partie.” Archives de Philosophie (1969): 609-638.
- Ion Tanasescu, ed. Franz Brentano’s Metaphysics and Psychology. Upon the Sesquicentennial of Franz Brentano’s Dissertation Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2012.
- Jacquette Dale. “The Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and Transcendent Intentional Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3 (1991): 177-202.
“The origins of object theory in the philosophical psychology and semantics of Alexius Meinong and the Graz school can be traced both to the insight and failure of Franz Brentano’s immanent objectivity or intentional in-existence thesis. The immanence thesis is documented, together with its critical reception in Alois Höfler’s Logik, Twardowski’s Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, and Meinong’s mature Gegenstandstheorie, in which immanent thought content and transcendent intentional object are distinguished, and Brentano’s thesis of immanent intentionality as the mark of the mental is reinterpreted to imply that only content is the immanently intentional component of presentations. Brentano’s thought from the early immanence thesis through the so-called Immanenzkrise and his later reism is explored against the background of his students’ reactions to the original 1874 intentionality thesis and its idealist implications, in the emergence of Meinong’s object theory and Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Finally, Brentano’s reism in the later ontology is critically examined, as his solution to ontic problems of immanent intentionality, limiting intentional objects to transcendent concrete particulars.”
- ———. “Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality.” In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale. 98-130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- ———. “Introduction: Brentano’s Philosophy.” In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale. 1-19. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- ———, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Contents: List of contributors XIII; Acknowledgments XVII; List of abbreviations XVIII; Chronology XX-XXII; 1. Introduction: Brentano’s philosophy by Dale Jacquette 1; 2. Brentano’s relation to Aristotle by Rolf George and Glen Koehn 20; 3. Judging correctly: Brentano and the reform of elementary logic by Peter Simons 45; 4. Brentano on the mind 66; 5. Brentano’s concept of intentionality 98; 6. Reflections on intentionality 131; 7. Brentano’s epistemology 149; 8. Brentano on judgment and truth by Charles Parsons 168; 9. Brentano’s ontology: from conceptualism to reism by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Barry Smith 197; 10. Brentano’s value theory: beauty, goodness, and the concept of correct emotion by Wilhelm Baumgartner and Lynn Pasquerella 220; 11. Brentano on religion and natural theology by Susan F. Krantz Gabriel 237; 12. Brentano and Husserl by Robin D. Rollinger 255; 13. Brentano’s impact on twentieth-century philosophy by Karl Schuhmann 277; Bibliography 298; Index 316-322.
- Kamitz Reinhard. “Acts and Relations in Brentano.” Analysis 22 (1962): 73-78.
- ———. “Franz Brentano. Wahrheit Und Evidenz.” In Grundprobleme Der Grossen Philosophen: Philosophie Der Neuzeit Iii, edited by Speck, Josef. 160-197. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1983.
- ———. “Die Rolle Der Deskriptiven Psychologie in Der Logik Brentanos.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2 (1989): 79-90.
- Kastil Alfred. Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Eine Einführung in Seine Lehre. Bern: A. Francke, 1951.
- Körner Stephan. “Über Brentanos Reismus Und Die Extensionale Logik.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 29-44.
- ———. “On Brentano’s Objections to Kant’s Theory of Knowledge.” Topoi 6 (1987): 11-17.
- Kotarbinski Tadeusz. “Franz Brentano Comme Réiste.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 459-476.
Translated in: Linda McAlister – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 194-203
- Krantz Susan. “Brentano’s Argument against Aristotle for the Immateriality of the Soul.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 63-74.
“The Aristotelian conception of the soul as Brentano understood it is examined, with respect to the nature of the soul and mainly to what Aristotle called the sensitive soul, since this is where the issue of the soul’s corporeity becomes important. Secondly the difficulties are discussed which Brentano saw in the Aristotelian semi-materialistic conception concerning the intellectual, as distinct from the sensitive soul from Brentano’s reistic point of view which and that it is an immaterial substance. Finally there follows a presentation of what is taken to be Brentano’s conception of the soul as it appears from a reistic interpretation of his analyses of the act of sensation and of the subject of sensation in order to shed some light on the reistic ontology that may be taken to underlie Brentanos’s psychology.”
- ———. “Brentano’s Revision of the Correspondence Theory.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3 (1993): 79-88.
“Franz Brentano took exception to the classic statement of the correspondence theory of truth, the thesis: veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. His reasons for objecting to it, and his proposed revision of the thesis, are interesting considered in themselves as well as for the light they shed on Brentano’s view of the relation between the thinker and the world. With regard to the former, it is shown how Brentano analyzes the adaequatio thesis word by word in order to demonstrate what he takes to be its fundamental incoherence. With regard to the latter, it becomes apparent, by contrast with the Thomistic understanding of the adaequatio thesis, that Brentano’s revision of it in the direction of a phenomenological theory of truth also involves a revised understanding of the nature of the thinker or knower.
- ———. “Brentanian Unity of Consciousness.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 89-100.
“Brentano’s thoughts on unity of consciousness are of central importance to an understanding of his psychology and of his ontology. By means of a reistic interpretation of his views on unity of consciousness, and in contrast with the Aristotelian approach to unity of consciousness, one begins to see the paradoxically objective and realistic spirit of Brentano’s subjectivism in psychology.”
- Kraus Oskar. Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis Seines Lebens Uns Seiner Lehre. Mit Beiträgen Von C. Stumpf Und E. Husserl. München: Beck, 1919.
- ———. Franz Brentanos Stellung Zur Phänomenologie Und Gegenstandstheorie. Leipzig: Meiner, 1924.
- ———. “On Categories, Relations and Fictions.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 42 (1942): 101-116.
- Küng Guido. “Zur Erkenntnistheorie Franz Brentano.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 169-181.
- ———. “Brentano an Ingarden on the Experience and Cognition of Values.” Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) 10 (1986): 57-67.
- ———. “Brentano, Husserl Und Ingarden Über Wertende Akte Und Das Erkennen Von Werten.” In Traditionen Und Perspektiven Der Analytischen Philosophie. Festschrift Für Rudolf Haller, edited by Gombocz, Wolfgang, Rutte, Heiner and Sauer, Werner. 106-117. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1989.
Selected Bibliography on Brentano’s Contributions to Logic and Ontology. Second Part: L – Z
- Ladusaw William. “Thetic and Categorical, Stage and Individual, Weak and Strong.” In Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory Iv, edited by Mandy, Harvey and Santelmann, Lynn. 220-229. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
“Brentano saw his task as giving a classification of cognitive acts. He categorized such ‘thoughts’ into three main groups: presentations, judgments, and love. By this unexpected latter term, he meant affectual attitudes.
The notion of ‘presentation’ in his system is both fundamental and difficult to grasp. Its essence is the idea that a cognitive agent can have a presentation of an object without it being the presentation of any particular object. One can entertain presentations of objects which do not nor could not have any real existence, like unicorns, golden mountains, and I suppose round squares. Achieving a presentation of something is the first step toward the other two types of acts, of which judgments concern us most.
Judgments (and affectual attitudes or reactions) come in contrary pairs of affirmation and denial, the two modes of judgment. The basis for a judgment is a simple or compound presentation, so the root of the thetic/categorical distinction is in the definition of possible bases for judgments.
The basis for a thetic judgment is a presentation of an object: an entity or eventuality. An affirmation of such a presentation commits the judger to the existence of something which satisfies the presentation; a denial by contrast expresses a negative existence judgment.
The basis for a categorical judgment is compound: first a presentation which is clarified into a particular object satisfying the description, and then a property to be affirmed or denied of the object.
Despite the conceptualist foundation of this system, I think we can model it with some familiar objects. Let us equate the notion of a presentation of an object for a description of an object. A description is something which can be satisfied by an object. Take object to range over both individuals and eventualities, and we have two sorts of descriptions: descriptions of an individual and descriptions of an eventuality. Properties we can take as basic, but crucially not as descriptions of an individual or an eventuality. The modified ontology then is summarized in (12):
12. Modified Brentanan Ontology
objects: individuals, eventualities
descriptions of individuals and descriptions of eventualities
The assumptions about the forms of judgment can be summarized in (13):
13. Judgment structure
a. Basis for a thetic judgment: a description
b. Basis for a categorical judgment: an object and a property.
c. A thetic judgment is an affirmation or denial of the description in the basis. (Existential commitment)
d. A categorical judgment is an affirmation or denial of the basis property to the object in the basis. (Predication)
Note that (13c) and (13d) contain a theory of negation which recognizes both a relational and a unary notion of negative mode of judgment. The utility of this distinction has been argued for eloquently in precisely the same tradition by Laurence Horn The natural history of negation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989, which put me onto this line of thinking.”
- Land J.P.N. “Brentano’s Logical Innovations.” Mind 1 (1876): 289-292.
- Libardi Massimo. “Franz Brentano (1838-1917).” In The School of Franz Brentano, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto. 25-79. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996.
- Macnamara John. “Cognitive Psychology and the Rejection of Brentano.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1993): 117-137.
- Marocco Angelo. Brentano. Le Prove Dell’esistenza Di Dio. Roma: Studium, 1998.
Con una scelta di testi di Franz Brentano.
- Marras Ausonio. “The Scholastic Roots of Brentano’s Conception of Intentionality.” Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche 1 (1974): 213-226.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 128-139
- Martin Wayne M. Theories of Judgment. Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- ———. “Fichte’s Logical Legacy: Thetic Judgment from the Wissenschaftslehre to Brentano.” In Fichte and the Phenomenological Tradition, edited by Waibel, Violetta L., Breazeale, Daniel and Rockmore, Tom. 379-406. Berin: de Gruyter, 2010.
“It is not usual to think of Fichte as a logician, nor indeed to think of him as leaving a legacy that shaped the subsequent history of symbolic logic. But I argue here that there is such a legacy, and that Fichte formulated an agenda in formal logic that his students (and their students in turn) used to spark a logical revolution. That revolution arguably reached its culmination in the logical writings of Franz Brentano, better known as a founding figure of the phenomenological movement. In logical writings that were published only posthumously, but that were fully elaborated in the decade prior to the publication of Frege’s Begriffschrift, Brentano (together with his collaborator Anton Marty) developed a radically innovative logical calculus that was explicitly designed to overthrow the orthodox logical analysis of judgment and inference. At the center of this revolution was the notion of thetic judgment [thetische Urteil], a form of judgment upon which Fichte had insisted in the first published version of the Wissenschaftslehre, and which his students subsequently set out to accommodate within the framework provided by Kant’s general logic. But thetic
judgment proved resistant to such assimilation, and it was left to Brentano to use the analysis of thetic judgment in his attempt to topple a long-standing logical tradition.
In what follows I reconstruct the main episodes in this century-long drama in the logical theory of judgment. My discussion is divided into four sections. I begin with a review of Fichte’s most explicit call for logical revolution, together with his introduction of the notion of thetic judgment, set against the backdrop of an anomaly within Kant’s logical commitments. In the second section I trace the logical treatment of this anomaly among Fichte’s philosophical progeny, in particular Johann Friedrich Herbart and Moritz Drobisch. The third section explores Brentano’s position, and his more radical solution to the anomaly bequeathed by Kant. In the final section I return to Fichte, to consider to what degree these subsequent developments remained faithful to the logical agenda Fichte had projected.”
- Mayer-Hillebrand Franziska. “Franz Brentanos Wissenschaftlicher Nachlass.” Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 6 (1952): 599-603.
- ———. “Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of Franz Brentano: A Reply to Dr. Srzednicki.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (1963): 438-444.
- ———. “Franz Brentano Einfluss Auf Die Philosophie Seiner Zeit Und Der Gegenwart.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 373-394.
- Mazzù Antonino. “Psychologie Empirique Et Psychologie Métaphysique Chez F. Brentano.” Annales de Phénomenologie 3 (2004): 17-57.
- ———. “La Question Du Rapport Intentionnel Chez F. Brentano.” In Questions Sur L’intentionnalité, edited by Couloubaritsis, Lambros and Mazzù, Antonino. 233-254. Bruxelles: Ousia, 2007.
- McAlister Linda Lopez. “Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence.” Journal of History of Philosophy 8 (1970): 423-430.
- ———. “Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality.” Review of Metaphysics 28 (1975): 328-338.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 151-159
- ———, ed. The Philosophy of Brentano. London: Duckworth, 1976.
Contents: Editor’s Introduction VII-IX; Oskar Kraus: Biographical sketch of Franz Brentano 1; Carl Stumpf: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 10; Edmund Husserl: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 47; Étienne Gilson: Brentano’s interpretation of medieval philosophy 56; Lucie Gilson: Franz Brentano on science and philosophy 68; E. B. Titchener: Brentano and Wundt: empirical and experimental psychology 80; Roderick Chisholm: Brentano’s descriptive psychology 91; Thomas De Boer: The descriptive method of Franz Brentano: its two functions and their significance for phenomenology 101; Herbert Spiegelberg: Intention and intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl 108; Ausonio Marras: Scholastic roots of Brentano’s conception of intentionality 128; Roderick Chisholm: Intentional inexistence 140; Linda McAlister: Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality 151; Roderick Chisholm: Brentano’s theory of correct and incorrect emotion 160; George Edward Moore: Review of Franz Brentano’s The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong 176; Gabriel Franks: Was G. E. Moore mistaken about Brentano? 182; Tadeusz Kotarbinski: Franz Brentano as Reist 194; D. B. Terrell: Brentano’s argument for Reismus 204; Hugo Bergmann: Brentano’s theory of induction 213; Oskar Kraus: Toward a phenomenognosy of time consciousness 224; Bibliography of the published writings of Brentano: 240; Bibliography of works on Brentano: 248; Index of names 255; General Index 259-262.
- ———. The Development of Franz Brentano’s Ethics. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982.
- McCormick Peter. “Sur Le Développement Du Concept De L’intentionnalité Chez Brentano Et Husserl.” Philosophiques 8 (1981): 227-237.
- Melandri Enzo. “The ‘Analogia Entis’ According to Franz Brentano: A Speculative-Grammatical Analysis of Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’.” Topoi 6 (1987): 51-58.
- Melle Ullrich. “Zu Brentanos Und Husserls Ethikansatz: Die Analogie Zwischen Den Vernunftarten.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 109-120.
- Mezei Balasz, and Smith Barry. The Four Phases of Philosophy. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998.
- Mezei Balasz. “Brentano and Husserl on the History of Philosophy.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 81-94.
“A particular subject-matter in Franz Brentano’s philosophy is his approach to the history of philosophy. I shall consider the evolution of his concept of the history of philosophy, the sources of this concept, and, finally, its relationship to Edmund Husserl’s understanding of the history of philosophy. Brentano’s scheme of the four phases of the history of philosophy can serve as a principle of evaluation of what comes after Brentano’s era in the history of philosophy.”
- Modenato Francesca. Coscienza Ed Essere in Franz Brentano. Bologna: Patron, 1979.
- Mohanty Jitendra Nath. The Concept of Intentionality. St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1972.
- Moore George Edward. “The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong.” International Journal of Ethics 14 (1903): 115-123.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), The philosophy of Brentano, pp. 176-181.
- Moran Dermot. “Brentano’s Thesis.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 70 (1996): 1-27.
- ———. “Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality.” Inquiry 43 (2000): 39-65.
“Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality to characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by descriptive psychology. Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano’s conceptual framework and presuppositions, located intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness (phenomenology). Martin Heidegger, Husserl’s assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped all reference to intentionality and consciousness in Being and Time (1927), and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Some recent commentators have sided with Heidegger and have endorsed his critique of Husserl and Brentano as still caught up in epistemological, representationalist approaches to intentionality. I argue that Heidegger is developing Husserl, focusing in particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, not reversing or abandoning his account. Heidegger’s criticisms of representationalism merely repeat Husserl’s. Furthermore, I argue that Husserl’s account of cognitive intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of practice. In short, Heidegger is more dependent on Husserl than he ever publicly acknowledged.”
- ———. “Franz Brentano: Descriptive Psychology and Intentionality.” In Introduction to Phenomenology. 23-59. New York: Roultdge, 2000.
- Morrison James C. “Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1971): 27-46.
- Morscher Edgar. “Brentano and His Place in Austrian Philosophy.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 1-10.
“The first part of this paper summarizes what I take to be the most important doctrines of Brentano’s philosophy. The second part investigates the possible meanings of the term ‘Austrian philosophy’. The third part attempts to say something about Brentano’s place in Austrian philosophy — whatever that may be –, while the fourth part focuses on a problem in which I am especially interested. The paper closes with a proposal for what the expression ‘Austrian philosophy’ could mean.”
- Mulligan Kevin, and Smith Barry. “Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1985): 627-644.
- Mulligan Kevin. “Judgings: Their Parts and Counterparts.” Topoi Supplement 2 (1988): 117-148.
- ———. “Sur L’histoire De L’approche Analytique De L’histoire De La Philosophie: De Bolzano Et Brentano À Bennett Et Barnes.” In Philosophie Analytique Et Histoire De La Philosophie, edited by Vienne, Jean-Michel. 61-103. Paris: Vrin, 1997.
- Münch Dieter. “Brentanos Lehre Von Der Intentionalen Inexistenz.” In Von Bolzano Zu Wittgenstein. Zur Tradition Der Österreichischen Philosophie, edited by Nyiri, Janós. 119-127. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986.
- ———. “Brentano and Comte.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 36 (1989): 33-54.
- ———. Intention Und Zeichen. Untersuchungen Zu Franz Brentano Und Zu Edmund Husserls Frühwerk. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1993.
- ———. “Die Einheit Von Geist Und Leib: Brentanos Habilitationsschrift Über Die Psychologie Des Aristoteles Als Antwort Auf Zeller.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 6 (1996): 125-144.
- ———. “Neues Zum Frühen Brentano.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (2004): 209-225.
- ———. “Franz Brentano Et La Réception Catholique D’aristote Au Xix Siècle.” In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis. 231-248. Villeneuve d’Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2004.
- Orth Ernst-Wolfgang. “Metaphysische Implikationen Der Intentionalität: Trendelenburg, Lotze, Brentano.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 7 (1997): 15-30.
- Parsons Charles. “Brentano on Judgement and Truth.” In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale. 168-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Pasquerella Lynn. “Intensional Logic and Brentano’s Non-Propositional Theory of Judgement.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 29 (1987): 117-119.
- ———. “Brentano and the Direct Attribution Theory.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 189-197.
“According to Brentano, what is characteristic of every mental act is the reference to something as an object. The exact nature of an object of our mental acts has, however, been first the subject of steady discussion in Brentano’s writings and consecutively gave rise to controversy for contemporary philosophers of mind; e.g. Chisholm, Castañeda. What follows is an elucidation of the relationship between Brentano’s final theory of sensation and its interpretation in Chisholm’s Direct Attribution theory as a consideration of a recent challenge by Castañeda: that while the Brentanian-Chisholmian account is exemplary in dealing with tacit self-reference at the level of unreflective consciousness, this theory needs to be developed even further to be adequate to those cases of self-reference involved in reflective consciousness.”
- ———. “Kotarbinski and Brentano on Truth.” Topoi Supplement 4 (1989): 98-106.
- ———. “Brentano and Aesthetic Intentions.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 235-249.
“Brentano’s philosophy of art, contained primarily in his book, Grundzuge der Ästhetik, is the result of an original theory of intrinsic value that was derived from Brentano’s philosophical psychology. In his aesthetics, Brentano endeavored to find an objective ground for the value of aesthetic contemplation through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. The lack of attention Brentano’s aesthetics has received is surprising, given that two of the many students Brentano influenced, Husserl (through the development of the phenomenological movement) and Ehrenfels (through the development of Gestalt psychology) have had an extraordinary influence on twentieth century perceptions of art. In this paper I will attempt to redress some of this neglect by outlining Brentano’s analysis of aesthetic intentions and the relationship his aesthetics bears to his overall philosophical system.”
- ———. “Intentionality, Phenomenology and Sensation in Brentano.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (Supplement) (2002): 269-279.
- Pavlik Jan. “Brentano’s Theory of Intentionality.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3 (1991): 63-70.
“Brentano’s intentional psychology is an attempt at overcoming the Humean tradition characterized by probabilistic empirism, subjectivism and psychologism. Intentional psychology enables restoration of the autonomy of human psyche with reference to natural laws as well as overcoming the reduction of specific subject-object relations to object-object relations realized in associationist psychology. In contrast with speculative approaches of German classical philosophy, Brentano’s theory enables empirical, non-metaphysical inquiry of subject-object relations.”
- Pietersma Henry. “Brentano’s Concept of the Evident.” Analecta Husserliana 7 (1978): 235-244.
- Poli Roberto. “Towards a Non-Symbolic Semantics.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 221-234.
“Starting from some ideas proposed by Suszko, Brentano’s non-propositional theory of judgement is considered. In order to clarify (some of) the formal and ontological aspects of his theory, the distinction between external (symbolic) and internal (non-symbolic) semantics is introduced and discussed.”
- ———. “Ontologia E Logica in Franz Brentano: Giudizi Categorici E Giudizi Tetici.” Epistemologia 16 (1993): 39-76.
“The various attempts to clarify and interpret Brentano’s logical analysis have merely provided a paraphrase of Brentano own words. We will analyse Brentano’s proposals against the background of traditional logic. In his Formale Logik, Bochenski explicitly warns us that logic not only “does not give proof of a linear continuity of evolution”, but that the logic which follows a long period of decadence “departs, for the most part, from different presuppositions and points of view, uses a different technique, and develops previously neglected aspects of the problematic. It is a different form of logic”. I shall bear these remarks of Bochenski’s carefully in mind and I shall argue that mathematically-based modern formal logic and syllogistic theory of the past exemplify two distinct formal paradigms. My reference to two different paradigms, and not just to two different calculuses, implies that most of the syllogistic reformulations of this century are, broadly speaking, suspect; and specifically because they take the syllogistic to be a part or a fragment of first-order predicative calculus. Careful study of traditional logic immediately shows that traditional logic expresses specific ontological perspectives which are deeply embedded in its formal structures. From this point of view, Brentano’s theory is a brilliant attempt to escape from some of the most difficult impasses of traditional logic and offers tools for new developments. Unfortunately, it arrived too late, just as the Fregean paradigm was about to burst on the scene.”
- ———. “Kotarbinski, Ajdukiewicz, Brentano: The Dispute About Reism.” In Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan. 339-354. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993.
- ———. “The Dispute over Reism: Kotarbinski – Ajdukiewicz – Brentano.” In Polish Scientific Philosophy. The Lwow-Warsaw School, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan. 339-354. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993.
- ———. “At the Origins of Analytic Philosophy.” Aletheia 6 (1994): 218-231.
- ———, ed. The Brentano Puzzle. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998.
Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke’s ‘Gottlob Frege as philosopher’ 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences and nuclei of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the ‘Brentano puzzle’ 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the Schubladenexperiment 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert’s theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong’s theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty’s philosophy of language 215-225.
“The papers collected in this volume arise from the conference “The Brentano Puzzle,” organized in Bolzano / Bozen, Italy, on the 14th and 15th of November 1996 by the Central European Institute of Culture.
The conference’s aim was to analyse the following puzzle. Even if the width and the depth of Brentano’s intellectual legacy are now well known, those asked to list the principal philosophers of the nineteenth century very rarely mention his name. We may call this puzzle the problem of Brentano’s ‘invisibility.’
It is obvious that Brentano’s invisibility has serious consequences on assessment of his philosophical theory. The reconstruction of Brentano’s thought is still flawed and incomplete. Moreover, Brentano’s emphasis on oral teaching, and the meagreness of his published work, compared with the enormous quantity of his manuscripts and correspondence, are also of theoretical importance because they are rooted in Brentano’s method of ‘doing’ philosophy. We know that the distinguishing feature of his philosophy was its empirical bias, its insistence on rigorous and partial answers rather than on the construction of systems. Given these features, it comes as no surprise that the same problem should be examined on several separate occasions and that different solutions should be proposed for it.
This procedure has a certain amount of inner coherence. Although Brentano always began his analysis with specific topics and problems, he proposed solutions which then reverberated through the entire edifice of his philosophy. This is a manner of philosophising which takes the natural sciences as its model. These factors also account for the different solutions that Brentano proposed for the problems he addressed. His thought, in fact, displays a continuity of method and a permanence of problems, but not a univocity of solutions. It is this aspect that allows one to talk of a school of Brentano among his pupils, to detect a ‘family resemblance’ among philosophers and scholars belonging to different disciplines. That is to say, the school is defined more by problems and the method used in their analysis than by their solutions in the strict sense. Accordingly, his heterodox followers, such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski, were more faithful to their master’s thought than the orthodox Brentanians like Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand.
One further component of the Brentano puzzle is that a number of Brentano’s outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their own schools. Suffice it to mention Husserl’s phenomenology, Twardowski’s Lvov-Warsaw school and Meinong’s Graz school. The personal success and academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano’s school (in the broad sense) have come to obscure their common thematic origins. The sub–)`;Ýësequent split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology generated, as a side-effect, the oblivion into which Franz Brentano’s thought then fell.
Nevertheless, Brentano and his school display surprising affinities with Frege and the tradition that he inspired. Perhaps the most interesting reconstruction of these connections is that accomplished by a number of works in German by Paul Linke. It was thought that a survey of Linke’s thought might prove useful to English readers. For this reason the book also contains the English translation of his ‘Gottlob Frege als Philosoph,’ published in 1947, with an introduction by Claire Ortiz Hill.
Last but not least, analyses of the relevance of Brentano’s and his followers’ theses for contemporary philosophical and scientific debate are also considered.” (Foreword by Roberto Poli)
- ———. “Brentano in Italy.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 233-257.
- ———. “Approaching Brentano’s Theory of Categories.” In Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang. 285-322. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2004.
- Potrc Matjaz. “Grades of Intentionality.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3 (1993): 71-78.
“Intentional inexistence is to be understood via directedness to an internal object which may but needs not exist. As far as the relation to the object exists, it is infallible – contrary to the fallible directedness at an external object. Brentanian intentionality is based on the evidence, and does not allow for degrees. Brentano has been careful to delimit his project of “Psychognosie” from the physical and from the physiological. The thesis of intentional gradation is discussed, which allows for three degrees. The first form of intentionality involves simple tropisms. The second grade of intentionality is the one of generality, as opposed to specificity and particularity. The third intentional grade would enable directedness to the singular.
As human organisms only are able to entertain directedness to the singular, brentanian intentionality would fall under the second kind of directedness, the one involving generality. Supposition that this thesis is right might then lead to the question whether Brentano really described intentionality specific for human organisms.”
- Prechtl Peter. “Die Struktur Der Intentionalität Bei Brentano Und Husserl.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2 (1989): 117-130.
- Rancurello Antos. A Study of Franz Brentano. His Psychological Standpoint and His Significance in the History of Psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1968.
- Richardson Robert. “Brentano on Intentional Inexistence and the Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (1983): 250-282.
- Rojszczack Artur. “Wharheit Und Urteilsevidenz Bei Franz Brentano.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 5 (1994): 187-218.
- ———. From the Act of Judging to the Sentence. The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005.
Edited by Jan Wolenski
- Rollinger Robin D. “Husserl and Brentano on Imagination.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 75 (1993): 195-210.
Reprinted with the title: Brentano and Husserl on Imagination in: R. D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 29-50.
- ———. Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999.
- ———. “Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl.” In Phenomenology and Analysis. Essays on Central European Philosophy, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang. 257-284. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2004.
Reprinted in: R. D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 233-262.
- ———. “Meinong and Brentano.” Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 1 (2005): 159-198.
“Meinong, like other noteworthy philosophers from central Europe, began his career in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano. Though Meinong’s philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian in character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain doctrines of his mentor. In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception, whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct classes and introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called “assumptions”. Thus he opposed Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and desires. Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as attainable through descriptive psychology (what might be called “descriptive phenomenology”), which is concerned with intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in any way differ methodologically from natural science.”
- ———. “Brentano’s Logic and Marty’s Early Philosophy of Language.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 12 (2006): 77-98.
- ———. “Brentano’s Psychology and Logic and the Basis of Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations.” The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication (2009): 1-23.
- Rossi Guido. Giudizio E Raziocinio. Studi Sulla Logica Dei Brentaniani. Milano: Sodalitas, 1926.
- Rothenberg Beno. “Studien Zur Logik Franz Brentano’s.” 1962.
Inaugural Dissertation. University Frankfurt am Main.
- Runggaldier Edmund. “On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of ‘Intentionality’ in Brentano.” Topoi 8 (1989): 97-103.
“The early Brentano identifies intentionality with “intentional inexistence”, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of Being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano.”
- Russo Antonio. “Franz Brentano E Heinrich Denifle: Un Carteggio Inedito.” Studium (2003): 333-356.
- ———. La Scuola Cattolica Di Franz Brentano: Heinrich Suso Denifle. Trieste: EUT, 2003.
Con un carteggio inedito F. Brentano – H. Denifle.
- Sanford David. “Chisholm on Brentano’s Thesis.” In The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, edited by Hahn, Lewis. Chicago: Open-Court Publishing Co., 1997.
- Sauer Werner. “Erneuerung Der Philosophia Perennis: Über Die Ersten Vier Habilitationsthesen Brentanos.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 58/59 (2000): 119-150.
- ———. “Die Einheit Der Intentionalitätskonzeption Bei Brentano.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (2006): 1-26.
“The objective of this paper is to refute the widely held view that in the wake of his so-called reistic turn Brentano subjected his notion of intentionality to a deep-going revision, viz., that he turned from an ontological account of the intentional object by way of identifying it with the thought-of-thing, i.e., the intentional correlate, or by way of attributing to it a peculiar sort of existence, to a non-ontological account thereof. It will be shown that neither the pre-reistic Brentano espoused anything of an ontological account of the intentional object in that he both distinguished it sharply from the intentional correlate and definitely rejected the idea of there being different sorts of existence, and it will be argued that the apparently ineradicable inclination to ascribe to the pre-reistic Brentano an ontological account of the intentional object stems from ignoring the Aristotelian background of Brentano’s thinking about relations.”
- Schaar Maria van der. “Evidence and the Law of Excluded Middle: Brentano on Truth.” In The Logica Yearbook 1998. 110-120. Prague: Filosofia, 1999.
- ———. “Brentano on Logic, Truth and Evidence.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10 (2003): 119-150.
“In this paper it will be argued that Brentano’s later writings about this topic can be understood better if one describes it as a result partly of his immanent development and partly of Brentano’s reactions to his contemporaries.”
- Schmit Roger. “Allgemeinheit Und Existenz. Zur Analyse Der Kategorischen Urteils Bei Herbart, Sigwart, Brentano Und Frege.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 23 (1985): 58-78.
- Schuhmann Karl. “Die Einwirkung Brentanos Auf Die Mûnchener Phänomenologen.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 97-107.
- ———. “Der Gegenstandsbegriff in Brentanos ‘Psychognosie’.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 5 (1994): 167-176.
- Sebestik Jan. “Bolzano Et Brentano. Deux Sources Autrichiennes Du Cercle De Vienne.” Fundamenta Scientiae 5 (1984): 219-235.
- Simons Peter M. “A Brentanian Basis for Lesniewskian Logic.” Logiquet et Analyse 27 (1984): 297-307.
Reprinted in: Peter Simons – Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays – Dodrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 259-269.
- ———. “Brentano’s Reform of Logic.” Topoi 6 (1986): 25-38.
Reprinted in: Peter Simons – Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays – Dodrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 41-69
- ———. “Brentano’s Theory of Categories: A Critical Reappraisal.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 47-61.
“In his doctoral dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles Brentano tried to show that (against criticism of this) one could indeed give a principle defense of Aristotle’s table of categories as a coherent system. In later texts Brentano appears sharply critical of Aristotle, mainly in respect to Aristotle’s mereology, or theory of part and whole, and to his theory of substance and accident.
It is argued that Brentano hadn’t observed that Aristotle’s belief that there are as many predicative senses of ‘be’ as there are categories of being is based not on his mereology but on his theory of definition. Overlooking this Brentano was led to far reaching inadequate ontological consequences.”
- Simons Peter M., and Wolenski Jan. “De Veritate: Austro-Polish Contributions to the Theory of Truth from Brentano to Tarski.” In The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School, edited by Szaniawski, Klemens. 391-442. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.
- Simons Peter M. “Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realists.” In German Philosophy since Kant, edited by O’Hear, Anthony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
“Although Brentano generally regarded himself as at heart a metaphysician, his work then and subsequently has always been dominated by the Psychology. He is rightly celebrated as the person who reintroduced the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of intentio back into the study of the mind. Brentano’s inspiration was Aristotle’s theory of perception in De anima, though his terminology of intentional inexistence was medieval. For the history of the work and its position in his output may I refer to my Introduction to the reprinted English translation. Alongside Aristotle the work shows influences of Descartes, Comte and the British empiricists. The theory of intentionality presented in the Psychology is much less modern and less plausible than almost all recent commentary would have it, and was in any case not where Brentano’s main interest lay. Intentionality simply served to demarcate mental phenomena from physical, in Book One, but the main aim was a classification of the mental, outlined in Book Two. Books Three to Five were to have dealt in detail with the three main classes of presentations, judgements and feelings, with the final book considering the metaphysics: mind-body and the immortality of the soul. Brentano’s shifting views, recently documented in English with Benito Muller’s translation of Descriptive Psychology, a work from the transitional 1890s, made the original plan obsolete. The role of an a priori, philosophical or descriptive psychology, methodologically prior to empirical-experimental genetic psychology, foreshadowed and influenced Husserl’s notion of phenomenology, and Brentano’s Comtean methodological epoche of desisting from controversial metaphysical statements in favour of an examination of the phenomena likewise presaged Husserl’s more ponderous phenomenological reductions.
Brentano’s other work covers most areas of philosophy, notably ethics, where he upheld a form of a priori intuitionism much admired by G. E. Moore, the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of language, deductive and inductive logic, and the history of philosophy. I shall mention just two areas. In his logic lectures from 1866 onwards (a compilation published 1956) Brentano rejected the subject-predicate analysis of simple judgements and proposed instead (for which he apparently secured written assent from Mill) that all judgements are logical compounds of positive and negative existential judgements. For example the universal judgement All men are mortal becomes the negative existential There are no immortal men. On this basis Brentano radically simplified the inference rules of deductive logic. While unlike de Morgan, Frege and others he does not go beyond logic’s traditional scope by recognising relations, within its bounds his reformed-term logic is simple, elegant and easily teachable. Some of his ideas in logic influenced the young Husserl. Unfortunately Brentano took against mathematical logic, which he wrongly associated exclusively with Hamilton’s confused doctrine of the quantification of the predicate. His inductive logic, which takes up by far the greater part of his logic lectures, remains unresearched to this day.” (pp. 118-119)
- ———. “The Four Phases of Philosophy: Brentano’s Theory and Austria’s History.” Monist 83 (2000): 68-88.
- ———. “Judging Correctly: Brentano and the Reform of Elementary Logic.” In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, edited by Jacquette, Dale. 45-65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Smith Barry. “Kafka and Brentano: A Study in Descriptive Psychology.” In Structure and Gestalt: Philosophy and Literature in Austria-Hungary and Her Successor States, edited by Smith, Barry. 113-160. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1981.
- ———. “The Substance of Brentano’s Ontology.” Topoi 6 (1987): 39-49.
- ———. “The Soul and Its Parts. A Study in Aristotle and Brentano.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1 (1988): 75-88.
“The attempt is made to show that the key for a correct interpretation of Brentano’s writings can be derived from an examination of his very early dissertations. The overarching context of all Brentano’s writings is the psychology of Aristotle and the ontology of material and immaterial substance that goes together therewith. The present remarks will accordingly consist in an account of Aristotle, and more specifically of Aristotle’s conception of the soul, as reflected by Brentano in his Psychology of Aristotle, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Descriptive Psychology.”
- ———. “The Primacy of Place: An Investigation in Brentanian Ontology.” Topoi 8 (1989): 43-51.
- ———. “On the Phases of Reism.” In Kotarbinski: Logic, Semantics and Ontology, edited by Wolenski, Jan. 137-184. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990.
- ———. “The Soul and Its Parts Ii: Varieties of Inexistence.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4 (1993): 35-52.
“A Brentanian might criticize contemporary philosophy of mind on at least the following counts:
i. its taxonomy of types of mental act and state is too narrow (thus its repertoire consists, on many standard accounts, in little more than ‘beliefs’ and `desires’);
ii. its treatment of mental acts and states is too slavishly oriented around linguistic factors (thus for example it is standardly suggested that the philosophy of mind is most properly concerned with the so-called ‘propositional attitudes’);
iii. its treatment of the temporal structures of mental acts and states is overly crude (thus in many standard accounts punctual and episodic acts are not distinguished from enduring states and dispositions);
iv. it presupposes an over-crude theory of the internal structures of mental acts and states and of the corresponding types of parts and unity.
It is with this last that we shall be principally concerned in what follows, and more precisely with Brentano’s own account of the part-whole structures obtaining in the mental sphere.”
- ———. Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano. Chicago: Open Court, 1994.
- ———. “Boundaries: A Brentanian Theory.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8 (2000): 107-114.
“According to Brentano’s theory of boundaries, no boundary can exist without being connected with a continuum. But there is no specifiable part of the continuum, and no point, which is such that we may say that it is the existence of that part or of that point which conditions the boundary. – An adequate theory of the continuum must now recognize that boundaries be boundaries only in certain directions and not in others. This leads to consequences in other areas, too.”
- Sorabji Richard. “From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary volume (1991): 227-259.
- Spiegelberg Herbert. “Der Begriff Der Intentionalität in Der Scholastik Bei Brentano Und Bei Husserl.” Philosophische Hefte 5 (1936): 75-91.
Revised by the author and translated in: Linda McAlister (ed.) – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 108-127
- ———. The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
Second revised edition 1978; Third expanded edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann 1982.
Chapter I. Franz Brentano (1838-1917) forerunner of the phenomenological movement – pp. 27-50.
“Brentano’s first concern in psychology was to find a characteristic which separates psychological from non-psychological or ‘physical’ phenomena. It was in connection with this attempt that he first developed his celebrated doctrine of intentionality as the decisive constituent of psychological phenomena. The sentence in which he introduces the term ‘intentionality’ is of such crucial importance that I shall render it here in literal translation: Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or sometimes the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call, although not quite unambiguously, the reference (Beziehung) to a content, the directedness (Richtung) toward an object (which in this context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-object quality (immanente Gegenständlichkeit). Each contains something as its object, though not each in the same manner. In the representation (Vorstellung) something is represented, in the judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is peculiar alone to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention (intentional). (1)Actually, this first characterization of the psychological phenomenon makes use of two phrases: ‘intentional inexistence’ and ‘reference to a content.’ It is the first of these phrases which has attracted most attention, and it has even given rise to the view, supported by both anti-scholastics and neo-scholastic critics, that this whole doctrine was nothing but a loan from medieval philosophy. While a quick reading of the passage may seem to confirm this view, it is nevertheless misleading. ‘Intentional inexistence,’ which literally implies the existence of an ‘intentio’ inside the intending being, as if imbedded in it, is indeed a Thomistic conception. But it is precisely this conception which Brentano himself did not share, or which in any case he abandoned, to the extent of finally even dropping the very term ‘intentionality.’ Thus, the second characterization of the psychic phenomenon, ‘reference to an object,’ is the more important and the only permanent one for Brentano; it is also the one listed exclusively in the Table of Contents, beginning with the first edition. What is more: as far as I can make out, this characterization is completely original with Brentano, except for whatever credit he himself generously extends to Aristotle for its ‘first germs’ in a rather minor passage of the Metaphysics (1021 a 29). It was certainly none of Brentano’s doing that this new wholly unscholastic conception came to sail under the old flag of ‘intentionality.’ Reference to an object is thus the decisive and indispensable feature of anything that we consider psychical: No hearing without something heard, no believing without something believed, no hoping without something hoped, no striving without something striven for, no joy without something we feel joyous about, etc. Physical phenomena are characterized, by contrast, as lacking such references. It also becomes clear at this point that Brentano’s psychological phenomena are always acts, taking this term in a very broad sense which comprises experiences of undergoing as well as of doing, states of consciousness as well as merely transitory processes. Here, then, Brentano for the first time uncovered a structure which was to become one of the basic patterns for all phenomenological analysis.” pp. 36-37
(1) Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I, Buch II, Kapitel I § 5 (pp. 125 f.; English translation p. 88).
- ———. “On the Significance of the Correspondence between Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 95-116.
“This correspondence, still unpublished, extends over fourty years. Its significance is both biographical and philosophical. Biographically it shows Brentano’s tolerant friendship for his emancipated student and Husserl’s unwavering veneration for his only philosophical teacher. The philosophical issues taken up are Euclidean axiomatics, Husserl’s departure from Brentano in the Logical Investigations by distinguishing two types of logic as the way out from psychologism, and the possibility of negative presentations, but not Husserl’s new phenomenology. Few agreements are reached, but the dissents were clarified.”
- Spinicci Paolo. “Realtà E Rappresentazione. Saggio Sulla Genesi Della Filosofia Dell’esperienza Nel Pensiero Di Franz Brentano.” Rivista di Storia della Filosofia (1985): 229-254.
- Srzednicki Jan. “Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of Franz Brentano.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (1962): 308-316.
- ———. “A Reply to Professor F. Mayer-Hillebrand.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (1963): 445-446.
- ———. Franz Brentano’s Analysis of Truth. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.
- ———. “Some Elements of Brentano’s Analysis of Language and Their Ramifications.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 434-445.
- Tanasescu Ion. “Das Seiende Als Wahres Und Das Sein Der Kopula in Der Dissertation Brentanos.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10 (2003): 175-192.
- Tassone Biagio G. From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano’s ‘Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint’ and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Tegtmeier Erwin. “Individuation, Identity and Sameness. A Comparison of Aristotle and Brentano.” Topoi Supplement 4 (1989): 117-126.
- Terrell Dailey Burnham. “Brentano’s Argument for Reismus.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20 (1966): 446-459.
Reprinted with revisions, in: Linda McAlister – The philosophy of Brentano – pp. 204-212
- ———. “Franz Brentano’s Logical Innovations.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1 (1976): 81-91.
- ———. “Quantification and Brentano’s Logic.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 45-66.
“Brentano’s innovations in logical theory are considered in the context of his descriptive psychology, with its distinction between differences in quality and in object of mental phenomena. Objections are raised to interpretations that depend on a parallel between Urteil and assertion of a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion as subject to description in a metalanguage and the Urteil as secondary object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest a reinterpretation of substitutional quantification, rendering the substitutional interpretation immune to problems that often arise as to the relation between substitutional range and referential range.”
- ———. “Brentano’s Philosophy of Mind.” In Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey – Vol. 4: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Fløistad, Guttorm. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983.
- Textor Mark. “Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness.” Dialectica (2006): 411-432.
“Brentano’s theory of inner consciousness has recently had a surprising comeback. However, it is still an open question how it is best understood. It is widely held that according to Brentano a mental act is conscious iff it is self-presenting. In contrast, I will argue that Brentano holds that a mental act x is conscious iff it is unified with an immediately evident cognition (‘Erkenntnis’) of x. If one understands Brentano’s theory in this way, it promises to shed light on standard problems for theories of inner consciousness.”
- Thomasson Amie. “After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness.” European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2000): 190-209.
- Tomasi Pietro. “The Unpublished “History of Philosophy” (1866-1867) by Franz Brentano.” Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 17 (2007): 99-108.
“There are many difficulties with the existing interpretation of Brentano’s works. The problem stems from the fact that Brentano’s works, letters, manuscripts, memoirs, etc. remain unpublished or undiscovered. Moreover some Brentano’s scholars, namely Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrandt, were incorrect in their method in publishing the philosopher’s works. Namely, they misinterpreted his earlier works by incorporating numerous interpolations from different time periods as being the philosopher’s final thoughts. More importantly, as evidenced by Antonio Russo’s recent discovery (*), they also failed to realise the fact that Brentano’s own theoretical views or works were mostly based on Aristotle and Thomas thoughts on metaphysics, that Brentano’s main intention was to develop a scientific demonstration on this topic, and that this issue occupied his mind until his death.
It is hoped that this paper goes some way in resolving the said errors and coupled with the continue discovery of new material that the jigsaw of Brentano’s works and thinking shall someday be correctly completed.”
(*) [See: Russo Antonio (2003)]
- ———. Una Nuova Lettura Dell’aristotele Di Franz Brentano Alla Luce Di Alcuni Inediti. Trento: Uni Service, 2009.
- Twardowski Kazimierz. “Franz Brentano and the History of Philosophy.” In On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy, edited by Brandl, Johannes and Wolenski, Jan. 243-253. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999.
Translation by Arthur Szylewicz of a review of F. Brentano, Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand (1895) published in: Przelom, 11 (II) August 3 1895, Vienna, pp. 335-346.
- Valentine Elizabeth. “The Relation of Brentano to British Philosophy.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10 (2003): 263-268.
“Brentano’s work has had, and has, its greatest influence in Austria, Germany, Poland and Italy, but its importance for an understanding of British analytical philosophy is increasingly being recognised.”
- Vallicella William. “Brentano on Existence.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (2001): 311-327.
- Vasyukov Vladimir L. “Antidiodorean Logics and the Brentano-Husserl’s Conception of Time.” Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 4 (1993): 373-388.
- Velarde-Mayol Victor. On Brentano. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2002.
- Vinogradov Evgeni G. “The Rationalistic Paradigm of Franz Brentano and Kazimierz Twardowski.” In The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna and Wolenski, Jan. 101-104. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.
- Volpi Franco. Heidegger E Brentano. L’aristotelismo E Il Problema Dell’univocità Dell’essere Nella Formazione Filosofica Del Giovane Martin Heidegger. Padova: Cedam, 1976.
- ———. “The Experience of Temporal Objects and the Constitution of Time-Consciousness by Brentano.” Topoi Supplement 4 (1989): 127-140.
- ———. “War Franz Brentano Ein Aristoteliker? Zu Brentanos Und Aristoteles’ Auffassung Der Psychologie Als Wissenschaft.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2 (1989): 13-29.
- ———. “La Doctrine Aristotélicienne De L’être Chez Brentano Et Son Influence Sur Heidegger.” In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis. 277-293. Villeneuve d’Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2004.
- ———. “La Doctrine Aristotélicienne De L’être Chez Brentano Et Son Influence Sur Heidegger.” In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis. 277-293. Villeneuve d’Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2004.
- Weingartner Paul. “Brentano’s Criticism of the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Principle ‘Ens Et Verum Convertuntur’.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 (1978): 183-196.
“This paper investigates Brentano’s criticism of the correspondence theory of truth within the context of a discussion of his ontological assumptions. Brentano’s interpretation of the formula veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus and of the principle ens et verum convertuntur is shown to fit into the history of these principles and into modern interpretations like that of Tarski.”
- Werle Josef. “Zur Edition Der Vorlseungen Franz Brentanos Über Geschichte Der Philosophie.” Phänomenologische Forschungen 12 (1982): 178-187.
- ———. Franz Brentano Und Die Zukunft Der Philosophie. Studien Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte Und Wissenschaftssystematik Im 19. Jahrhundert. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989.
- Werner Alfons. Die Psychologisch-Erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen Der Metaphysik Franz Brentanos. Hildesheim: Borgmeyer, 1930.
- Wolenski Jan. “Brentano’s Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski’s Semantic Theory.” Topoi 8 (1989): 105-110.
“This paper is a sequel to Simons and Wolenski [De Veritate: Austro-Polish contributions to the theory of truth from Brentano to Tarski, 1989], which contains a short discussion of Brentano’s arguments against the theory of truth based on the concept of a correspondence between truth-bearers and reality (or its appropriate portions). In that paper we attempt to show that Tarski’s conception successfully meets Brentano’s objections. l Here I should like to extend as well as, in some points, improve what we said in Simons and Wolenski . There are several reasons for doing this. First, the renaissance of Brentano’s own philosophy and Brentanism in general requires that his arguments deserve considerable attention. Secondly, Brentano’s arguments against the correspondence theory of truth have become part of philosophical folklore.
Thirdly, Tarski’s semantic truth-definition, despite the reservations raised by several authors, is often considered as a possible modern interpretation of the classical theory of truth. Fourth, Tarski’s theory of truth is deeply rooted in the Brentanian theoretical tradition, independent of Tarski’s own philosophical consciousness.
It is further interesting to see how, if at all, his definition of truth is affected by critical arguments of his philosophical great-grandfather (via Twardowski, Lukasiewicz, Lesniewski and Kotarbinski).” (notes omitted)
- ———. “Brentano, the Univocality of Thinking, ‘Something’, and ‘Reism’.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 5 (1994): 149-166.
“Brentano’s argument for Reism from the univocality of ‘thinking’ is examined. Firstly, Brentano’s original formulation is given. Secondly, comments on the argument made by Marty, Kamitz, Teller and Farias are summarized and briefly discussed. The univocality argument is then embedded into the frameworks of two logical systems: predicate calculus and Lesniewskian ontology; the latter system is shown as a more effective basis for reism than the former. Finally, it is argued that a distinction between formal-ontological reism and metaphysical reism should be made.”
- ———. “Reism in the Brentanist Tradition.” In The School of Franz Brentano, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto. 357-375. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996.
- Wüstenburg Klaus. Die Konsequenz Des Phänomenalismus. Erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchungen in Kritischer Auseinandersetzung Mit Hume, Brentano Und Husserl. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004.
- Zahavi Dan. “Back to Brentano?”. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 66-87.
“For a couple of decades, higher-order theories of consciousness have enjoyed great popularity, but they have recently been met with growing dissatisfaction. Many have started to look elsewhere for viable alternatives, and within the last few years, quite a few have rediscovered Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of consciousness will be outlined and discussed. It will be argued that it can contribute important insights to our understanding of the relation between consciousness and self- awareness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some problems, and that it will ultimately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the lookout for promising alternatives to the higher-order theories, than to return all the way to Brentano.”
- Zelaniec Wojciech. “Franz Brentano and the Principle of Individuation.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 6 (1996): 145-164.
“In this article I discuss a view on individuation exposed by Brentano in his Theory of Categories. According to this view, it is the spatial location of a physical thing that is its principle of individuation. I put forward hypotheses concerning the assumptions on the force of which Brentano might have arrived at this view. I also assess the `price’ that has to be paid for making such assumptions.”
- ———. “Disentanling Brentano: Why Did He Get Individuation Wrong?”. Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 7 (1997): 455-463.
- Zimmer Alf. “On Agents and Objects: Some Remarks on Brentanian Perception.” In Consciousness, Knowledge and Truth, edited by Poli, Roberto. 93-112. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993.
- Zingari Guido. “Brentano Und Leibniz: Erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen.” Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2 (1989): 31-42.